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•
Street-level bureaucrats working in the field of migration enforcement have the uneasy task of finding irregularised migrantsand processing their cases – often until deportation. As the encounters are unforeseeable and characterised by tension and
emotions, bureaucrats develop practices and strategies, which help them to manage the often very personal encounters. Besides
the frequently debated strategies summarised under the term ‘copying mechanisms’ and the problem of ‘dirty’ or many hands,
ignorance as a tactic in the daily work of bureaucrats has not been studied to a sufficient extent.
This work looks at how ignorance, including deliberate not-knowing or blinding out, as well as undeliberate partial-knowing
or being kept ignorant, is used in public administration, through multi-sited, ethnographic fieldwork in migration offices and border
police/guard offices of three Schengen Member States: Sweden, Switzerland and Latvia. It distinguishes between structural and
individual ignorance, which both have the ability to limit migrant’s agency. Further, by analysing their intertwined relation, this
article furthers our understanding of how uncertainty and a lack of accountability become results of everyday bureaucratic encoun-
ters. Ignorance thus obscures state practices, subjecting migrants with precarious legal status to structural violence.
Keywords: bureaucracy, agntology, ignorance, migration, public administration, discretion.
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Introduction
I am taking part in a summons regard-
ing the deportation of a family to Italy.
The Swiss Cantonal Migration Officer F
asks the father if they are willing to
leave. He answers: ‘Would I be alone,
yes, but I have a family. We do not want
to live like animals. It does not suffice
- food, portable toilets, no roof over our
heads. And they are threatening us to
deport us back to Lebanon.’ F does not
react to this answer and continues work-
ing on the forms, in front of his laptop,
skipping to the next question: ‘Do you
have other documents than your iden-
tity cards?’ – ‘No.’ The situation is tense,
the translator gets increasingly uncom-
fortable, one of the children is about to
cry. A quick exchange on the poor men-
tal and physical health of the family is
followed by the father’s comment: ‘I am
not responsible if something happens to
my family. You are responsible.’ F con-
tinues filling in his forms, turns around
to the translator, with a final remark
and question: ‘Yes, sure. You are com-
municating in Arabic?’ (Swiss Cantonal
Migration office 2016)
Bureaucratic encounters, such as the one above,
have often been characterised as painstaking,
absurd and chiefly as a violent interaction
caused by bureaucratic indifference (Herzfeld
1992). Also recent and former fictional depic-
tions of bureaucracy (see Loach 2016, Kafka’s
‘The Trial’ 1925 and Gogol’s ‘The Overcoat’
1842) regularly take up the issue of a care-
less and user unfriendly, even hostile environ-
ment of public administration, elucidatingwhat
Gupta (2012) described as individuals’ - includ-
ing the welfare ‘poor’ (cf. Gilliom 2001) or mi-
grants1 —experiences of structural violence in
encounters of public administration.
The fictional and actual study of bureau-
cratic behaviour (cf. Lipsky 2010; Fassin 2013;
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Herzfeld 1992) mutually highlight a general dis-
interest and incomprehension on the side of
the bureaucrat towards their clients. The ar-
bitrary position towards the applicants’ needs
is especially observable in forced encounters
between migrants with precarious legal sta-
tus and street-level bureaucrats, discussed in
this work. For this marginalised group, bu-
reaucratic interaction usually implies a nega-
tive outcome: detention and deportation.
However, the encounters are not only de-
marcated by indifference or disinterest, but also
by ignorance. In order to understand the dy-
namics of these emotionally laden and con-
tested encounters, disregarding whether the in-
teraction happens willingly or is coerced, this
work will introduce the theoretical concept of
ignorance, which adds to theories on street-
level bureaucracy. Ignorance as deliberate or
undeliberate lack of or gaps in knowledge (in
a simplified definition), contributes to our un-
derstanding of bureaucrat’s everyday practices
within the migration regime as it reveals how
(non-)knowledge can be (un)consciously used
by all actors involved, including bureaucrats
and migrants, as well as be an inherent part of
the ‘state’ and its structures.
This article thus analyses the creation and
use of ignorance in government agencies deal-
ing with the enforcement of migration policies
on a structural and individual level. While it
postulates that ignorance is an inherent and in-
tegral part of the otherwise non-unitary state
structure, it steps further and aims to analyse
the street-level bureaucrats’ use of ignorance,
which includes un-knowing, partial knowing
or blinding out knowledge. By analysing the
intertwined relation between structural and in-
dividual ignorance, this work is able to contex-
tualise uncertainty and lacking accountability
as outcomes of daily bureaucratic encounters.
These include the gap of knowledge on pro-
cedures which either are not part of the daily
work, or - having a greater impact - should be
known but are ignored. On a more moral level,
it encompasses bureaucratic behaviour regard-
ing the more personal side of the encounters,
where empathy might be kept hidden, because
of more personal reasons and pragmatism. It
is thus able to not only raise relevant concerns
about how administrative and moral aspects of
ignorance create intangible practices and emo-
tionally charged encounters, but also unsound
practices.
The analysis, looking at strategies of igno-
rance used by bureaucrats, migrants and within
state structures, is preceded by a theoretical
conceptualisation of ignorance in relation to in-
difference and uncertainty. It is followed by a
brief methodological description of where and
how fieldwork was conducted. Finally, the con-
clusion summarises the tactics used in the daily
work of public administration. Distinguishing
between different individual and structural ig-
norance facilitates a better comprehension of
how structural violence, uncertainty and diffu-
sion of accountability are reproduced, but also
under what circumstances.
Theoretical Framework
When conceptualising discretionary spaces,
several strategies such as coping mechanisms
(de Graaf, Huberts, and Smulders 2014; Tum-
mers, et al. 2015) , cherry-picking or foot drag-
ging (Scott 1990; Lipsky 2010; Eule 2014) ex-
plain the realities of public offices. Further, rou-
tinisation and attitudes of indifference to detach
oneself from work practices (Blau and Meyer
1987; Herzfeld 1992) and the diffusion of many
hands (Thompson 1980) underline ways of bu-
reaucrats dealing with their everyday work, re-
ducing their accountability. With Tummers,
et al. (2015) broadly conceptualise coping as
‘behavioural efforts frontline workers employ
when interacting with clients, in order to mas-
ter, tolerate, or reduce external and internal de-
mands and conflicts they face on an everyday
basis’ (Tummers, et al. 2015, 1100; cf. Bor-
relli and Lindberg, 2018, on creative strategies),
‘coping’ presupposes a conscious action. Ig-
norance in contrast does not only materialise
in reactions to the cross pressure of policy de-
mands, citizens’ claims and the state agencies’
organisation, or as practices reflecting personal
ideas and values, which are actively pursued.
Instead it also encompasses more unconscious
moments, where one is not aware of knowl-
edge, or moments where one is held ignorant.
Ignorance thus plays a crucial role in migrant-
bureaucrat encounters, since it brings forwards
how it can be used as coping mechanism, but
also how it is structurally placed and uncon-
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sciously imposed, while influencing the every-
day practices and reflections of street-level bu-
reaucrats (as well as migrants).
Ignorance can surely be found in other ad-
ministrative contexts and thus applies to other
bureaucrats, such as social workers or teachers.
While the findings can be used in a broader con-
text, this study however wants to highlight the
particularity of the public administration stud-
ied here. Within the migration apparatus (Feld-
man 2012), bureaucrats work in a field of severe
ostracism and coercive practices towards an al-
ready strongly marginalised group. In this ap-
paratus they can either use ignorance as a tactic
to enforce power-inequalities pre-established
by legal frameworks, or subvert them. They are
at the same time influenced and constrained by
their knowledge and the gaps, created by the
structural organisation of state agencies. In ei-
ther way, the existence and use of ignorance,
passive or active, subtle or crude, highlights the
extreme situation migrants face in their every-
day lives, as well as the state’s capacity to gov-
ern them.
As such, the use of ignorance in context
of irregularised migration highlights the repro-
duction of structural violence, and also reveals
how ignorance that is structurally imposed on
the bureaucrat supports the increasingly re-
strictive position of the researched countries to-
wards migration (cf. Borrelli, 2018; Eule, et al.,
2018). Indeed, similar toHerzfeld’s (1992, 1, 18f)
and Arendt’s (1963, 283) take on how given bu-
reaucratic structures create and amplify indif-
ference and a banal evil among frontline staff,
their legal mandates and tasks of the interlocu-
tors, as well as the organisational structures fa-
cilitate ignorance —something presented in the
analytical section.
Defining Structural Violence in Bureau-
cratic Encounters
In the following, structural violence will mainly
be understood according to Galtung (1969) and
Gupta (2012). While Galtung (1969) names un-
equal distribution of power and unequal life
chances, caused by poverty, marginalisation
and exploitation (Galtung 1969, 171; cf. Rylko-
Bauer and Farmer 2016; Garver 1973), Gupta
(2012, 20) adds the inability to identify a single
actor responsible for a violent act to the concept
of structural violence.
Though this concept is mostly used when
studying the loss of life due to social condi-
tions (Høivik 1977; Simmons and Casper 2012),
the depicted encounters between street-level
bureaucrats and migrants with precarious le-
gal status strongly reflect structural violence
in a more banal way. Especially since irreg-
ularised migrants are a marginal group with
fewer rights, though often contributing with
work and tax payments to societies which
reject their presence (Chauvin and Garcés-
Mascareñas 2014), it is they who are system-
atically being denied agency (Jackson 2013)
through the use of ignorance. Thus, comb-
ing the concepts of ignorance and structural
violence will not only tell us how the former
supports the latter, but also how ignorance le-
gitimises structural violence as it limits the
‘other’s’ agency, for example by consciously
creating knowledge gaps and not acknowledg-
ing the other’s aspirations and thus, voice. It
highlights the inequalities that shape power re-
lations between the migrant subject and the
‘state’, represented by the bureaucrat in the Eu-
ropean migration regime.
The Relation Between Indifference and Ig-
norance
The worst sin towards our fellow crea-
tures is not to hate them, but to be in-
different to them: that’s the essence of
inhumanity. (Shaw 2015)
Following the Oxford dictionary, indifference
is described as a ‘lack of interest, concern,
or sympathy’, including a notion of unimpor-
tance. Connected to Nair’s (1999) understand-
ing, indifference is the ‘language of denial’,
‘achieved in institutional set-upswhere bureau-
cratic rules end up thwarting, even damaging,
every people they were meant to help’ (ibid.:
13). However, bureaucrats do not simply treat
each case similarly, thus suggesting indiffer-
ence can be characterised by an absence of feel-
ings (Watkin 2014, 50), but bring their attitudes
into the processing of cases.
This stands in contrast to indifference as
absence of meaning or relationship (Deleuze
1994). Indifference is a disinterest towards the
person, which does not motivate the bureaucrat
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to familiarise themselves with the client’s case
file or history. Ignorance can instead be influ-
enced by (unconscious) knowledge gaps, per-
sonal values and an active manipulation of in-
formation. While both indifference and igno-
rance can help the bureaucrats to not step be-
yond their actual tasks, ignorance goes beyond
the concept of ‘not caring’ (Herzfeld 1992) and
can function as moral resistance (Proctor 2008).
Although both, ignorance and indifference of-
ten refer to denial (Nair 1999) and are immanent
in the space of bureaucracy, both terms have to
be seen as related but not equal concepts.
Understanding Uncertainty
Besides indifference being partly connected
to ignorance, uncertainty also plays a crucial
role in understanding how structural violence
is produced and upheld. This work argues
that besides the general uncertainty existing
in migrants’ everyday life, it is strongly pro-
duced through ignorance during bureaucratic
encounters. Especially in context of deporta-
tion and detention, where power struggles and
unequal forces are tangible, uncertainty is a se-
rious outcome for the migrants, who are held in
a status of ‘not knowing’ or imperfect knowl-
edge (Smithson 2010). Uncertainty is linked to
an outcome which lies in the future, charac-
terised by delay and distance (cf. Beck 2008), al-
though its consequences are fairly palpable (e.g.
anxiety, stress).
This differentiation is crucial with regards
to the outcome of ignorance. The latter is able
to maintain and manipulate behaviour, knowl-
edge transfer and information, resulting in un-
certainty as a mode of being kept ignorant and
manipulated (Proctor 2008). Thus, ignorance
encompasses gaps of knowledge and forms of
resistance (ibid., 8), while actively or passively
producing uncertainty.
Understanding Ignorance
Ignorance has been defined in various ways in
scholarly literature (cf. Smithson 1989; Galison
2004). While individuals do not have the ca-
pacity to know everything (Douglas 1986) and
do not have access to all knowledge, they also
have the ability to decide what to know (Stel
2016; cf. Beck 2008 on the conscious or uncon-
scious inability-to-know). Thus, ignorance can-
not be understood as pure absence of knowl-
edge (Croissant 2014) or stupidity (Gupta 2012),
but as something, which can be actively upheld
and maintained or also manipulated (McGoey
2012b). By using ignorance as an active or pas-
sive strategy to cope, evade or engage with sit-
uations, individuals show varying degrees of
agency remaining players ‘acting within rela-
tions of social inequality, asymmetry, and force’
(Ortner 2006, 139). Subjects are partially know-
ing (Giddens 1979), underlining not only the se-
lective vision of ignorance, but also the individ-
uals’ ability to act on and sometimes against the
structures that made them (Ortner 2006, 110).
Consequently, ignorance is entangled in human
relations and interactions.
While there is a difference between con-
scious and unconscious ignorance, which can
lead to either active or passive strategies of
ignorance (one can consciously not seek for
information and knowledge which is avail-
able, thus rendering oneself passive; while one
can unconsciously be ignorant due to a lack
of knowledge and information available), this
work rather focuses on the origins of ignorance.
While trying to elaborate on how (un)conscious
or active/passive certain ignorance is within the
following analysis, the main argument in this
work is the twofold nature of ignorance. First,
it is created by a structural setup of the state and
its agencies, which through their rules, frame-
works and hierarchies create opportunities for
ignorance to arise. This institutionalised ig-
norance (Beck 2008) is constructed, preserved
and —with time— reproduces itself through the
practiced (un)conscious and active or passive
ignorance of street-level bureaucrats. Second,
personal values and opinions can create strate-
gies of ignorance, which do not necessarily go
against the structural setup, but have the po-
tential to contest the state and policies. Thus,
while state structures can create gaps of knowl-
edge and ignorance which the street-level bu-
reaucrat may be unaware of, leading to a repro-
duction of structural violence through routine
practices and the selected knowledge acquired
by bureaucrats, bureaucrats also have the abil-
ity to consciously use ignorance to follow their
own values, make work easier (see coping), or
to reproduce the structural ignorance placed
upon them in the first place. Similarly, migrants
canmake use of strategies of ignorance or being
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kept ignorant by the bureaucrat or the ‘state’.
The key contribution of this work is that it
highlights the violent outcomes of the interre-
lation between structural and individual igno-
rance, enhancing intangible practices. While
ignorance embedded in public administration
seems to be part of any given discretionary
space, and thus still legally sound (though ulti-
mately morally contestable), the created gap of
information can force street-level bureaucrats
to tinker practices which might follow the in-
tention of policies, while at the same creating
unexpected outcomes.
Ignorance on the individual level can con-
test the structural side, to the (dis)advantage of
the migrant with precarious legal status. Bu-
reaucrats can resist legal guidelines and frame-
works (consciously or not), including situa-
tions where bureaucrats ignore what should
be known regarding their routines and legal
procedures. This ‘stepping beyond their ac-
tual mandate’, thus moving in the realm of
unsound practices, can lead to sanctions (job
loss), but also highlights how ignorance can be
morally charged and produce harm. Indeed, ig-
norance on an emotional level can block out
and neutralise (Sykes and Matza 1957) every-
day encounters with clients defined by ‘spon-
taneity, perishability, emotionality, vulnerabil-
ity’ (Geertz 1973, 399). This production of
‘anonymisation of persons’ (ibid., 398) or dis-
tancing (Eule 2014) allows encounters not to be-
come personal, while still processing cases as
expected. Generally, screening or shutting out
are forms of denial where the individual only
sees partially (Cohen 2001).
Finally, asking who doesn’t know and why
not, can map the political geography ignorance
creates. Bringing structural and individual as-
pects of ignorance together advances and un-
derstanding of how systems of oppression aim
to silence the subject (Tuana 2008, 109) as the
deliberate maintenance of un-knowledge and
the withholding of information towards mi-
grants incapacitates them.
Methodological Framework
This article is based on several months of ethno-
graphic fieldwork in migration offices (Switzer-
land, Latvia), border police units (Sweden) and
border guard services (Latvia), as well as lo-
cal police units (Switzerland). The selection of
these three countries is based on the interest
to study state agencies’ answer to irregular mi-
gration within the Schengen area, as well as
to the given possibilities of accessing the field.
While Sweden and Latvia are more centrally
organised and Switzerland has a federal struc-
ture, further differences are found in the di-
verse geographical position (external and in-
ternal borders), organisational set-up, migra-
tion policies and migrant populations arriving.
However, structural and individual strategies of
ignorance play a crucial role in the everyday life
of each group of bureaucrats, no matter how di-
verse their tasks and education are. Thus, this
work can contribute by bringing forward cru-
cial similarities, which have a strong effect not
only on the bureaucrat, but also on case out-
comes, thus finally on the migrant with precar-
ious legal status.
Between 2015 and 2017 data- deriving from
participant observation, semi structured inter-
views and formal interviews or conversations-
was collected. It was triangulated with the
study of internal policy papers and case files
(Flick 2011). The observed interactions between
migrants and street-level bureaucrat, including
(mobile) police officers or case workers in the
office, have in common that the migrant sub-
ject was always in a precarious legal status. Ei-
ther their asylum application was rejected and
they were pushed to leave the country, they
worked illegally (sometimes without knowing),
or were placed in detention to await deporta-
tion. Regarding the used field notes, street-level
bureaucrats have been named with capital let-
ters and gender pronouns have been avoided.
The collected recounted stories are situa-
tionally produced (Ewick and Silbey 1995) but
embedded in a larger context disclosing power
relations, which are hidden in social meaning.
In order to study ignorance, participant obser-
vation helped to pinpoint moments where such
ignorance became more evident. At the same
time the interpretation of observed scenes and
recounted stories connected to written state-
ments and reports allows for a deeper under-
standing of ignorance already inherent in the
government structure.
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Ignorance in Street-Level
Encounters
The following observation was collected dur-
ing fieldwork at a Swiss Cantonal Police Sta-
tion 2017. Depending on the size of the can-
ton and the number of foreigners living in it,
the cantonal police will have a specialised unit
taking care of deportations and detentions, and
also informing other police units about the cur-
rent migration status of apprehended foreign-
ers. The unit receives cases, and thus people,
through the cantonal migration office. The ex-
cerpt highlights the manifold ways in which ig-
norance is present and how it is linked to indif-
ference.
G (a police officer of the migration po-
lice unit I am visiting) invites me to fol-
low to the detention centre and quickly
informs me about the detainee. Believ-
ing the detainee is from Eritrea, after
briefly screening the files, G translates a
couple of sentences, via an online tool,
in Tigrinya. I ask if G knows about
the detainee’s other language skills, but
G shrugs. Besides, the sentences trans-
lated only cover the section on health,
“the rest will be fine […], we’ll see how
it works out.” No phone translator is
arranged. However, when we enter the
meeting room, G searches for a transla-
tion of the detention order in Amharic.
After looking at the case filemore closely
G realized that the detainee turns out to
come from Ethiopia. When a translation
cannot be found, G does not bother and
takes out an English one. I have time
to screen the case file. The detainee will
be sent to Germany. My attention wan-
ders off to the great amount of avail-
able languages in which the detention
order is available. All other forms are
only available in German and English
and are brought by the officer. G re-
marks: “Well, if the intellect is miss-
ing, he can sit here for an hour, read
and not understand anything. But with
this translation he at least has some-
thing in his hands.“ G also explains
that the detainee should have received
the deportation decision during his stay
in the reception centre, and thus as-
sumes he knows what is going to hap-
pen. When the detainee arrives, G be-
gins the conversation in German and af-
ter not hearing what the detainee an-
swers switches to English. G: „Do you
speak English?“ - „Small.“ G: „Small,
ok. My name is G. I am from the po-
lice. You know your situation?“ The de-
tainee seems confused. G: „No Asyl in
Switzerland. Asyl is finished here.“ G
hands over the detention order. „This
is my order. You sign? You go back
Germany. You sign or not, what you
want.“ After a couple of minutes of un-
successful communication, the detainee,
though explaining he does not under-
stand what the form means, agrees to
sign. G has still not enquired about the
detainee’s mother tongue and continues
to believe it is Amharic. Therefore, G
hands him the next forms in English.
Finally, the detainee asks if there is a
Somali translation – he does not speak
Amharic after all. G looks at me and
I nod. The next form informs the de-
tainee about the entry ban to Switzer-
land. G: „The territory of Switzerland is
closed for you. 3 years no Switzerland.
Only information – migration gave it to
you, just info. You sign or not?“ Again
the detaineementions he does not under-
stand but signs. G replies: „You under-
stand? Yes, you understand. The terri-
tory of Switzerland is closed to you for
3 years and you can say to the prob-
lem what you want here (pointing to a
line on the form). I explain you situa-
tion now. You understand.“ G points to
the line where the detainee could make
a statement on the entry ban. „You can
say sign or not sign.“ Again the detainee
mentions he would sign even though he
does not understand. Now, G starts to
get a bit insecure, decides to put ‘signa-
ture denied’ on the form and signs him-
self. Then G looks at the detainee: „But
now you know the situation in Switzer-
land.“ (Swiss Cantonal Police Unit 2017)
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The fieldnote starts out with the indifferent
attitude ofG towards the detainee. By not look-
ing closely to the file, G overlooks relevant in-
formation for the encounter and acts indifferent
towards the case and the detainee. However,
besides the disinterest towards the client,G also
does not deem the available information as rele-
vant for the work task, thus ignoring it, keeping
the file closed. The officer is confident to know
enough to be prepared, which turns out to be
wrong. Further, the quality of the encounter is
of no interest to G, reducing the level of infor-
mation exchange to a minimum, as G assumes
all relevant information has been given to the
detainee beforehand. Thus, what starts out as
an indifferent attitude, discloses several strate-
gies of structural and individual ignorance go-
ing beyond what indifference is able to explain.
While the active refusal to understand can
be seen as an act of agency, moments where
migrants genuinely do not understand are not.
The detainee is not aware of what will happen
to him and voices his struggle to understand.
However, he is willing to sign the forms, dis-
regarding his lack of knowledge. He is liter-
ally depending on the knowledge of the offi-
cer, who decides how much to share, since he
is detained, without access to other knowledge.
As I encounter many of these interactions, it is
valid to mention that power inequalities (Gal-
tung 1969) and thus structural violence are very
much present at any moment, as each inter-
action is characterised by different amounts of
information handed out, thus decapacitating
the clients to various degrees. During hear-
ings of the Swedish Border Police regarding the
prolongation of detention the officers clearly
explain that no further questions will be dis-
cussed. Any attempt to break this rule is met
with firm refusal to answer and repetition of
this rule (Fieldnotes, 2017). It is they who de-
cide how much information is shared and it is
them who decide if the other has understood.
While the bureaucrat is able to withhold
information at any time, leaving the client in
a state of un-knowledge or partial knowledge
and thus uncertainty, the migrant has only lim-
ited influence. This is partly supported by the
procedures of the system, in which the offi-
cer is the last one in a line of bureaucrats who
processes the case, thus accepting it without
much reflexivity. (S)he does what is expected
of her/him.
Street-level bureaucrats often explain their
blocking of client’s questions with their lack of
responsibility. To them more knowledge given
to the migrant would not make a difference (see
G) as they perceive cases as closed and clients
should understand that ‘this’ is the end of all
procedure, that it is time to leave. B, a case-
worker in a Swiss cantonal migration office, ex-
plains: ’Other colleagues might read through the
asylum application interview, but I do not. It is
of no interest to me, it is all lies anyway (laughs).
I just know, this person has to go and I do it. The
national migration office can take care of the rest ’
(Fieldnotes, 2016). Like many other colleagues
the caseworker simply practices the ’won’t tell,
[…] don’t know, and frankly […] don’t care’–
attitude (Bauman 2008, 70). Knowledge of the
case is irrelevant, as according to B one does not
need to know a case in order to process it.
Also, all interlocutors imply that acquir-
ing of more information might not reduce un-
certainty or ignorance, but can lead to con-
fusion where information conflicts (Smithson
2010). Ignorance is thus presented as a strat-
egy to avoid complicated encounters to suppos-
edly ‘help’ the client to understand. The de-
cisions taken are within the given framework,
and thus resemble the everyday discretionary
choices bureaucrats make.
Refusing to get acquainted with a case more
than the officers deem to be necessary is thus a
‘professional’ decision developed with experi-
ence. Many times, I get a quick shrugwhen ask-
ing about details of the cases, added by a short:
»I do not know« or »I do not care«.
Reducing the intake of information might
facilitate the workload as it takes less time to
get familiar with a case, thus only ‘relevant in-
formation’ to fulfil a task is screened. Officers
working with detention and deportation do not
need to know the entire asylum request, the
stories told and the reasons for rejection. In
their everyday work, they are the ones »exe-
cuting orders« (Fieldnotes, 2016–2017). Taking
in more information than is relevant to imple-
ment their work is time consuming. While not
necessarily misguiding the clients of public ad-
ministration, the ignorance of personal stories
and information – for whatever reason - adds a
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moral value to the denial of migrants’ agency.
Like F in the first fieldnote, limiting the en-
counter to a set of simple questions asked to the
detainee, keeps the conversation and discussion
to a minimum. Uncomfortable knowledge is
kept at bay or is dismissed (Rayner 2012).
However, while police officers/border
guards are not bound to double-check cases and
screen decisions already taken by the migration
office or migration courts, their work needs to
be grounded on correct decisions. Some infor-
mation is relevant to performwell, and thus the
process of deciding what to read and what not
is crucial. Also, by reading decisions and files,
officers could have the opportunity to function
as a last control mechanism, while also being
emotionally and professionally responsive to
their opposites.
Besides the active ignorance of available
facts, the fieldnote elucidatesG’s lack of knowl-
edge, increasing the probability of flaws. While
G does not seem to bother to get a decent
translation, G is also unaware of the existing
languages of the detention orders, thus acting
on partial knowledge or even non-knowledge.
This negligence can cause serious trouble for
the processing of cases and of course for the
individual who might be detained or deported.
While individuals cannot and do not know ev-
erything (Douglas 1986; Croissant 2014),G’s at-
titude goes beyond simply being careless, yet
remaining entirely confident, assuring me the
meeting went as expected. This reduction of
the migrant to a passive element denies them
the same capacities and reproduces structural
violence (ibid., Gupta 2012). Despite getting fa-
miliar with someone’s case in order to address
them correctly as sign of respect (cf. Smithson
1989),G also denies the detainee a proper trans-
lation, creating unsound administrative prac-
tices caused by ignorance. Legally, G has to
meet the client in detention, who has a right to
be heard, though due to the ignorant strategies
it actually loses its validity, as the client does
not understand what will happen to him.
Street-level encounters strongly reflect the
function of ignorance as reinforcement of tradi-
tional values andmaintenance of privileged po-
sitions and expertise (Moore and Tumin 1949).
Obviously, there is different access to knowl-
edge and it is the street-level bureaucrat who
can choose to disclose information in order to
fulfil their task or follow their own moral sen-
timents (or not). At the same time, it under-
lines the broad discretionary space they have
in defining their tasks. As such, informing the
detainee is highly subjective. ToG the tasks are
fulfilled sufficiently. Where street-level bureau-
crats follow readymade patterns and engage in
a common idea of how the job is done, ‘the in-
dividual’s notions of right and wrong are rigid-
ified [and] susceptibility to new knowledge and
influence is minimized’ (ibid., 791).
Also, many bureaucrats assume that all of
their clients lie (see B) or are well-informed
(G), accounting for the unwillingness of street-
level bureaucrats to repeat explanations on pro-
cedures and thus maintaining a state of ig-
norance among detainees. Some officers pre-
serve stereotypes, depending on narrowly de-
fined roles, reducing information on the oth-
erwise often personal encounters. This type
of ignorance is required, ‘whenever knowledge
would impair impersonal fulfilment or duties’
(Moore and Tumin 1949, 793). For officers, ig-
norance often functions as a positive and active
element of operating structures, thus does not
leave the structure dysfunctional (ibid., 795). In
contrast, the migrant experiences a great de-
crease in agency. G’s rhetoric question ‘You
understand?’ and own answer ‘Yes you un-
derstand’ are just one example of many en-
counters, where bureaucrats did not listen suf-
ficiently. The asymmetry of power structures
visible in these encounter prove how quickly
ignorant behaviour is produced and used in ev-
eryday encounters. For G the meeting is one
of many, a practiced routine, thus so banal that
the actual execution of meetings easily white-
washes structural violence (Proctor 2008; Slater
2012).
In other situations, officers might resort to
more passive ignorance, letting clients talk and
ask questions, without taking the stories and
concerns into account. F resumes work, filling
out papers, while the client continues talking
and explaining. Here the client’s voice might
be allowed, but not heard. It is not simply indif-
ference but the assumption of irrelevance that
lead officers to neglect knowledge and infor-
mation. It is also a strategy to meet the ex-
pected outcome: filing forms, thus keeping up
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productive tasks, is combined with teaching the
client a lesson: no matter how much one com-
plains, what story is told, there is nothing that
can be done. Ignorance becomes a productive
asset to justify and evade responsibility (Mc-
Goey 2012a; Stel 2016). The stalling (Stel 2016)
and stonewalling (Sedgwick 1990 see also F)
is an intentional strategy to reduce the intake
of information, thus highlighting the resistance
to get involved too deeply, which functions as
a coping mechanism (de Graaf, Huberts, and
Smulders 2014; Blau and Meyer 1987).
O: ‘The back side of the job is: If you see
more than the usual human being sees,
your mind set changes. One is more in-
volved and knows more.’ (Field Notes,
Swedish Border Police 2017)
What O refers to is the struggle to leave work
with a free and unbothered mind. O previously
worked as border control staff at the Airport,
where »one hands over the case to another per-
son. It is easier to switch off and the next day
one comes back and one has something new.«
Instead, in the current job as a regular border
police case worker O follows cases until de-
portation, which »is sometimes not that easy«
(Fieldnotes, 2016). When thinking about the
caseload, O mentions having been involved in
about one hundred cases since starting the job
5 months ago. ‘I should not think about it. It is
nearly the same as to think about the universe.’
However, it is not only the sheer amount of in-
formation, but also the personal involvement in
cases, which makes it difficult for street-level
bureaucrats to ‘switch off’. Efforts to blind out
personal stories and values, which might inter-
fere with their work is met with strategies to
reduce involvement.
While the ‘shutting out’ of daily work expe-
riences is connected to taking a break from the
‘job’, tasks and eventually unpleasant encoun-
ters, the blocking out of personal views reduces
friction regarding the execution of tasks. How-
ever, being ignorant towards ones own emo-
tional and political viewpointsmight reduce the
ability of reflection. Declining to reflect on ones
own positions during work might disrupt the
carefully maintained work free zone of private
life, underlining the struggle officers might go
through to be able to ignore.
However, the use of ignorance can also be
directed against the agency, the structure and
thus the state, highlighting individual igno-
rance regarding bureaucrats’ own views and
norms. Refusing to take up orders and going
against guidelines and regulations is an active
decision to ignore, and to follow own hidden
transcripts (Scott 1990). This bears the danger
of taking upmore discretion than the structures
grant, and results in less common, but more dis-
ruptive moments.
A person from the National Swiss Mi-
gration Agency calls the cantonal mi-
gration office – a man with an Italian
residence permit was apprehended, but
the cantonal office decided not to take
any actions because he has refugee sta-
tus and an Italian residence permit. The
national office wonders why they did not
detain, as he could still be returned to
Italy. U later tells me: “They just wanted
to get rid of him, or put him in jail, but
he had documents. If they seem valid,
one has to let him go. The Italians should
have told the national office about his
documents.” U walks over to W’s of-
fice and summarises the call. W: “Ev-
erything is perfectly fine. It is not in
our competence and does not interest us.
And the National Office can surely tell
us what they think we should do, but
we will do what we want to. The use
of coercive measures lies in the compe-
tence of the canton. He is recognised as
a refugee. We could have detained him,
but why would we? For us he is a tourist
and it would not make any sense to de-
tain him. And we are not talking about
a package or something, but about a hu-
man being. Also, he could sue us in the
end and then we would eventually have
to pay him a compensation for the de-
tention.” (Field notes, Swiss Cantonal
Migration Office 2016)
The excerpt elucidates how ignorance can
have a positive outcome for the otherwise often
marginalised client. While detention as mea-
sure can be used, the decision lies in the hands
of the cantonal migration office. Thus, it highly
depends on personal decisions and the use of
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discretionary spaces (Lipsky 2010; Eule 2014).
Here, the bureaucrat voices two reasons for re-
futing the national office’s suggestion. It is a
will to acknowledge the impact detention has
on a human being, but also the assumed costs if
they fail to proof the necessity for detention in
front of the court. Ignoring the general routine,
guided by the national office, W actively goes
against their way of handling it, thus ignoring
generally accepted practices to the advantage
of the client and finally their own office. A sec-
ond encounter between W and another Dublin
case elucidates what Smithson (2008) calls ‘ar-
rangement of ignorance’. The client has been
deported from Sweden to Switzerland, as the
latter is responsible for the decision on the case.
However, the client was already rejected. Now,
by turning up again, the officer could detain
him. However, W openly explains, as if talking
to himself, what options could follow: »You will
be detained and sent back to your home country,
if you turn up again. But if you would abscond,
there is nothing we can do…« (Field notes Swiss
Cantonal Migration Office 2016). In contrast to
situations where officers keep information hid-
den (e.g. not telling about deportation dates),W
openly shares what will happen, going against
the actual rules, which W certainty is aware of.
W discloses information, which should not be
given, ignoring the fact that it would be coun-
terproductive to his actual task: to implement
deportation orders. Instead, W openly shares
knowledge and information, as if the client was
not visible (Smithson 2008), using ignorance as
strategic ploy (Proctor 2008). Ignorance can
thus also become knowledge (McGoey 2012a).
In yet another case, two Swedish border po-
lice officers admit to have shuffled cases un-
der their piles of documents, in order to ‘for-
get about them’, to either give migrants more
time before a deportation or even to make
Dublin deportation cases a national responsi-
bility (if timeframes are not respected). Go-
ing against legal practice because of practi-
cal thinking or bureaucrats’ own ideas of right
and wrong brings forward an individual set
of thoughts and a morally charged work envi-
ronment, where structural violence is strongly
intertwined with strategies of ignorance. Ig-
norance, acted out passively or actively, con-
sciously or not, always ends up in a highly un-
certain outcome for the migrant. Looking at
everyday encounters of bureaucrats and their
‘clients’ enabled me to define how far igno-
rance is used and produced and for which rea-
sons. Surely ignorance is used as strategy to
refrain from accountability and responsibility
(cf. Sykes and Matza 1957), avoiding emo-
tional responses and moral assessment (Smith-
son, 2008). What might be used as a strategy to
avoid internal conflicts in organisations (Smith-
son, 2008), such as managing heavy workload,
ends up being a key demarcation for the devel-
opment structural violence.
Migrants’ Use of Ignorance
Regularly I observed interactions between mi-
grants and bureaucrats involving questions re-
garding their legal advisors. Their dependence
on third parties who are supposed to help them
appeal the case often results in experiences
of financial exploitation and partial knowl-
edge. Again, the acting upon partial knowl-
edge, clearly underlining unequal positions and
thus structural violence, impacts on the clients’
ability to claim agency and causes great uncer-
tainty even when following legal bureaucratic
avenues.
Though focus is put on the institutional and
bureaucrats’ use and production of ignorance
and the harmful outcome for migrants, it is rel-
evant to shortly contextualise migrants’ strate-
gies of ignorance. These often resemble street-
level bureaucrat’s practices and the interplay
of bureaucrats’ and migrants’ ignorant strate-
gies generates unintended outcomes (Smithson
2008). Migrants too leave out relevant infor-
mation (about their origin, age, journeys), ig-
nore the information they receive and act upon
what they deem best for themselves. Stel (2016)
uncovers agnotological responses of Lebanon’s
Palestinian refugees living in unofficial camps.
Using the institutional ambiguity of the camps’
existence, migrants’ strategies often are closely
connected to resisting the structural violence
and uncertainty they face in their everyday
lives. Their strategies are more clearly directed
against the state apparatus, regardless of their
active or passive nature. Often, their use of ig-
norance is a reaction to the uncertainty created
through bureaucratic uses of ignorance.
However, the very different outcome of ig-
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norant behaviour for the migrant reflects the
power structures that are at play here. Not only
does the client depend on the willingness of the
bureaucrat to inform them, but also acting upon
partial or un-knowledge can lead to severe con-
straints, displaying their precarious situation.
Should one abscond because a caseworker sug-
gests it (see W )? Is it helpful not to disclose
the identity and ‘refuse’ cooperation in order to
hinder deportation, while increasing the risk of
being detained? Even though a certain amount
of agency is kept by every individual (Ortner
2006), twisting the power-play to their favour
often comes with a high price of remaining in
precarious legal status. (Un)conscious igno-
rance is reflected in Swedish border police and
migrant encounters, where many migrants are
apprehended at work, because legally they are
not allowed to work according to the migration
office. Assuming that the personal card handed
out by the tax office and paying tax allowed
them to find a job, many migrants are detained
for their breach of law. Latvian border guards
mention the unwillingness of Vietnamese de-
tainees to share information; they do not tell
their names and do not contact the Vietnamese
embassy for paperwork in order to leave. Other
tactics of ignoring deportation orders are hand-
ing out wrong addresses, being on the move
or absconding. Some bureaucrats also mention
women getting pregnant, absconding until they
are too advanced in their pregnancy to be de-
ported.
Ignorance as Inherit Feature of the State
Street-level bureaucrats excuse their work by
refusing knowledge, thus responsibility, there-
fore showing indifference, but also reveal their
unintentional lack of knowledge. Structurally
created ignorance allows bureaucrats to com-
plete their tasks, while blinding out ‘unneces-
sary information, deemed irrelevant to the job.
It creates ‘conditions which ensure its contin-
uance’ (Frye 1983). Consequently, ignorance
adds a wilful side (Beck 2008), which is sys-
tematically maintained (Smithson 2008), thus
adding an active component to the creation of
structural violence experienced by migrants.
While inheriting traditional values of the
organisations assures the system’s continu-
ance and hides the punitive character of the
state (Slater 2012), street-level bureaucrats are
trained by them, learning to put trust into a sys-
tem which equips them with knowledge on ev-
eryday tasks. Hence, bureaucrats automatically
make use of structures of ignorance inherent to
the state, embedding them in their work. By
engaging in their routines and not asking ques-
tions, bureaucrats maintain the state of not-
knowing. They do not simply create their own
spaces of ignorance, which they willingly fos-
ter to either face or keep out of moral dilem-
mas, uneasy cases and thoughts. Instead, the
structure of a state agency impacts on their ig-
norance, shapes it and eventually maintains it
in a similar way as bureaucrats manipulate and
control migrants’ knowledge. Thus, ignorance
is co-produced by policies, laws, migrants as
well as bureaucrats, but deeply embedded on a
structural level.
Generally, the most common tasks and
practices will be solved through ‘learning-
by-doing’, rather than through prior study.
This leads to certain practices being contin-
ued, while others are not. This learning pro-
cess is not monitored, and by grounding the
major work processes on an experience-only
and learning-by-doing structure, training pro-
grams and cooperation networks seem to de-
liberately accept and even institutionalise igno-
rance (Slater 2012).
While a Latvian border guard explained that
before the restructuring each officer was re-
sponsible for a case from the very beginning to
the end (meaning deportation), the division of
labour creates spaces of ignorance within the
agency. Officers keep working in their some-
times very narrow environment, encouraging a
narrow mind-set. The dispersal of responsibili-
ties surely supports such behaviour, as does the
division of work processes.
On a structural level, ignorance might be
not only accepted, but even actively encour-
aged, because knowledge is associated with
power and thus can become a danger (Proctor
2008). Therefore, keeping staff in doubt about
possible practices might be a means to not only
disperse accountability but also avoid conflict-
ing guidelines or practices. Certain information
is withheld by superiors and not shared with
the street-level bureaucrat. Hence, the manip-
ulation of knowledge of others can be observed
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along a line, from structural to individual level.
While some officers are very keen to avoid
getting too involved in a case, the system’s
general structure can make it very difficult for
more ‘interested’ employees to get to know a
case. A Latvian risk analysis specialist under-
lines how he had to study by himself. No sup-
port or training were available after a certain
level, thus forcing him to find new sources of
knowledge (Field notes 2016). Also, for the
Swiss and Swedish bureaucrats it is very im-
portant to have as much information on a per-
son before they apprehend, detain and even-
tually deport them. Detailed information, e.g.
about the health, potential aggression or phys-
ical abilities, is not only relevant to maintain
their own safety, but also to guarantee the mi-
grant’s well-being. However, knowledge in mi-
gration office differs from that available in bor-
der police units, due to different databases and
information access. Slow bureaucratic chains
of communication (see Borrelli, 2018) further
contribute to bureaucrats’ acceptance that not-
knowing needs to be accepted in certain mo-
ments.
Also, the bureaucratic structure might sup-
port ignorant behaviour on side of the migrant.
In 2016 the National Swiss Migration Office
decided to financially punish cantons which
have not been able to process Dublin returns
in their given time frame. The offices have six
months to process and send back the client in
order to get reimbursed for the costs on na-
tional level. If they fail the costs remain a re-
sponsibility of the canton. However, if a per-
son absconds before the six months are over,
the time for a return will be extended to a to-
tal of 18 months. Resorting to financial pun-
ishment on national level encourages cantonal
offices to, indirectly ‘support’ absconding (see
W ). While the organisation of the agency ma-
nipulates knowledge and information received
by the bureaucrat (or not), the individual and
personal interaction with the client is charac-
terised by a consecutive manipulation (Proc-
tor 2008, 24). Handing out partial knowledge
on possible detention might tip off the migrant
enough to decide to abscond. Where a lack
of knowledge can actually help the bureaucrat
to differentiate between what is important and
not in order to keep the system running, the
migrant often wishes to receive as much in-
formation as possible. Hence, social practices
of ignorance bear the imprint of power rela-
tions and reproduce taken-for granted worlds
(Ewick and Silbey 1995, 215; Smithson 2008, 218
f). The cultivation of ignorance helps the state
agency to excuse their employees that they did
not know better (Proctor 2008; McGoey 2012a,
2012b; Michaels 2008) and functions as social
control.
‘Ignorance is frequently constructed and ac-
tively preserved, and is linked to issues of cog-
nitive authority, doubt trust, silencing, and un-
certainty […] [thus] intersects with systems of
oppression’ (Tuana 2008, 109). Power relations
are embedded in an institutional order (Gid-
dens 1979) and play out in the actual social in-
teractions on the ground. Ignorance can be
seen as a means of power relations, even if
not used consciously. It is often deeply em-
bedded in the structures of the agency and
thus shapes the individual’s disposition (Ortner
2006) and traditions. These individuals are fi-
nally guided by the embedded ignorance and
often end up accepting it. However, the individ-
ual always maintains a certain range of agency
(Giddens 1979; Scott 1990), eventually follow-
ing their own ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1990),
made possible through the structures allowing
for discretion and thus opening up the potential
use of ignorance against the state.
Conclusion — What Is The Cost of
Ignorance?
This article has attempted to map how struc-
tural and individual strategies of ignorance
cause state practices to become highly intan-
gible and unreadable. It not only places igno-
rance as constitutive strategy of the state but
highlights that ignorance and being ignorant is
used as legitimate strategy in avoiding respon-
sibility towards migrants. The bureaucrats dis-
cussed here have the particular task to detect,
detain and deport migrants with precarious le-
gal status. At times, they lack the professional
knowledge to fully act, but are still expected
to and at the same time ever-changing policies
make it difficult for them to do so (Fieldnotes,
Sweden 2017). While bureaucratic procedures
are generally acknowledged to change at a high
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pace (cf. Eule, et al., 2018), the field of migra-
tion is characterised by an increasing restric-
tive position-both in the researched states and
many other Schengen Member States, as well
as increasing politicisation.
As a concept, ignorance explains how
knowledge is manipulated and how non-
knowledge is produced, used, reproduced and
acted upon by state agents, as well as migrants.
While ignorance is an integral part of the state,
as practices are based on knowledge and the
lack thereof, street-level bureaucrats and mi-
grants can partly use the structurally embed-
ded strategies of ignorance to regain agency.
While bureaucrats use ignorance to manage
their tasks, they also engage in such strategies
to reduce the emotional labour, as well as to
follow their own ideals and values, or resisting
against what they deem unfair state practices.
Presented data shows that bureaucratic agen-
cies dealing with the active implementation of
detention and deportation orders, which both
have physical consequences, often underline
their role as just ‘doing the job, implementing
orders’. Through this distancing between the
ones responsible taking the orders and them-
selves, bureaucrats deny migrants the possibil-
ity to act. Thus, their behaviour shapes mi-
grants’ behaviour, but also silences them. Mi-
grants are being kept ignorant and they might
base their decisions on the lack of knowledge
and the manipulated information they receive.
This in turn strongly impacts on their uncertain
future, as people act upon knowledge but also
on the un-knowledge they possess.
Uses of ignorance manifest at times in the
pure neglect of actual procedures and practices,
thus highlighting the maliciousness of the bu-
reaucratic encounter. Showing how structural
and individual strategies of ignorance play out
and are intertwined, highlights how structural
violence is not only already embedded in the
agencies’ structures, but also how it is repro-
duced and its effects multiplied. Relating indi-
vidual with structural aspects of ignorance in
bureaucratic everyday work underlines how a
banal, but severe reproduction of harmful ef-
fects comes into being. Both sources of igno-
rance affect each other and thus can be influ-
enced and manipulated.
This work has tried to show that a gap be-
tween knowing and un-knowing does not sim-
ply come into being through individual deci-
sions only. It rather manifests through the mul-
tiple ways un-knowledge is produced, main-
tained and reproduced. Even active striving for
a reduction of un-knowledge on both sides, the
migrant and the bureaucrat, might not reduce
their state of deprivation. Instead, the state can
be understood as ‘the ignorant’, producing and
facilitating moments of ignorance, though not
fully capable of entirely controlling its use and
outcomes. Ignorance is thus a constitutive part
of the system. At the same time, the concept
of ignorance, in contrast to indifference, brings
back responsibility to the individual using it.
It does not deny agency, but allows for a dis-
tinction of uses of ignorance, thus demarcating
when ignorance has been used in what way to
distinguish between acts of resistance and acts
of neglect.
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Endnotes
1. This article wants to highlight that besides the sel-
domly ‘voluntary’ visit of individuals to the municipal-
ity or other state agencies, migrants are neither citizens
nor ‘clients’ of welfare, and as such are not entitled to
be treated as such. The encounter with bureaucrats is
often forced upon these migrants with precarious legal
status, on which this study focuses, and strongly impacts
on migrants’ lives. Throughout this work I will refer to
the term ‘migrant with precarious legal status’ if gener-
ally talked about; otherwise I will refer to the respective
legal status, such as detainee, Dublin deportee, rejected
asylum seeker, and other.
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